Five EU member states aim to sign at least one "return-hub" partnership with a third country by the end of 2026, with a formal agreement possible in early 2027.

Germany, Austria, Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands — the "group of five" driving the EU's offshore detention model — held active negotiations with Rwanda this week, Germany's Der Spiegel reported. Rwanda's Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe would say only: "The visit indeed occurred and the negotiations are ongoing."

What is the legal basis?

The talks rest on the EU Return Regulation, politically agreed by the European Parliament in June by 418 votes to 218. The law lets an EU country, or the bloc itself, strike arrangements with a third country to transfer people already subject to a return decision.

Crucially, transfers can occur even where the person has no prior connection to the host country — by nationality, residence or transit. Removal counts as complete once the person reaches the designated third country. The regulation has been politically agreed but has not formally entered into force.

Which rights concerns have been raised?

The Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O'Flaherty, sent a letter in July to the five governments. He urged a "comprehensive ex ante assessment of potential direct or indirect human rights risks" before any deal is struck.

Sara Prestianni, advocacy director at the NGO Euromed Rights, told Euronews the candidate countries are "characterized by human rights violations". She questioned what methodology is being used to assess human rights compliance.

The regulation requires third-country partners to respect international human rights standards and the principle of non-refoulement. Critics argue the assessment is not explicitly mandated and that oversight is missing.

What previous schemes have shown

• The UK–Rwanda partnership (2022): only four voluntary relocations occurred before the scheme ended. UK government data put combined costs at £715 million, including Illegal Migration Act implementation.
• Italy's Albania offshore centers (opened October 2024): projected 3,000 migrants a month. Real total since conversion in March 2025 to a deportation-only facility: around 500 people. Cost: over €670 million. The legality of transfers is now before the EU Court of Justice.
• US third-country deportations: a Senate minority report found five governments received $32 million in direct payments and at least $7.2 million in flight costs for approximately 300 transfers by January 2026.

Where could the first hub open?

Rwanda sits at the top of the list. The Gashora Transit Centre, roughly 60 km from Kigali, hosted migrants stranded in Libya from 2019. Government spokesperson Yolande Makolo told local radio that many have since left.

Uganda is also in advanced discussions, Greek daily Kathimerini reported. Kenya and Ghana have been named as possible sites. AFP reported in April that the five countries were weighing agreements with roughly ten states in total.

What comes next?

Immigration ministers from the five states meet in Copenhagen on 4 September, hosted by Danish immigration minister Morten Bødskov. Germany's Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt is due to attend. The European Commission will join as an observer.

Could the hubs distort the EU's return system?

Member states issue several hundred thousand return decisions each year. A single hub, based on US figures, would handle only a few hundred cases annually — a marginal share of the overall caseload.

Davide Colombi, a migration researcher at CEPS, sees a more basic negotiating problem: "I definitely see questions as to what the third country might ask in return for hosting people who are not nationals of that country."

Analysts warn of "policy entrapment": once costs are sunk, poor results may lead not to closure but to higher payments, weaker safeguards or further diplomatic concessions to rescue the project.

France and Spain have publicly questioned the hubs' effectiveness. The European Commission is informed but is not directly involved in the bilateral or coalition talks.

For now, all that is confirmed is that the conversation has moved from speculation to an actual delegation on the ground in Kigali — with the next real test at the Copenhagen ministerial on 4 September.